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NOTE
A

"INTEGRATION Now :
STUDY OF ALEXANDER V. HOLMES COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

I. Introduction
It is hereby adjudged, ordered, and decreed:

1. The Court of Appeals' order of August 28, 1969, is vacated, and
the case is remanded to that court to issue its decree and order, effective
immediately, declaring that each of the school districts here involved
may no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color, and
directing that they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems
within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any kchool
because of race or color. Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,
396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).

With these words the United States Supreme Court, in'a per curiam de-

cision rendered on October 29, 1969, unmistakably announced that "the time
for delay is over" in the desegregation of southern public school districts.' The
Court's order marked the culmination of a series of suits brought over a period
of several years concerning school desegregation in Mississippi.2 Though the
petition before the Court formally embraced only nine actions brought by
private Negro plaintiffs against fourteen Mississippi school districts,' the Court's
disposition of the petition governed several additional suits instituted by the
Justice Department involving nineteen other Mississippi districts.' Thus, the
ruling immediately affected a number of school systems in only one state; however, it "will affect far more than the 33 Mississippi districts directly involved.
It will apply to hundreds of communities in the South - and possibly to some
in the North, as well." 5
1 N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1969, at 44, col. 1.
2 Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 328 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1964);
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist. 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966), injunction
pending appeal granted, 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Mathews, 403 F.2d 181 (5th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) (S.D. Miss., May
13, 1969), rev'd, 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969), delay in enforcement granted, Nos. 28030 &
28042 (5th Cir., Aug. 28, 1969).
3 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.; Anderson v. Canton Municipal Separate
School Dist. & Madison County School Dist.; Barnhardt v. Meridian Separate School Dist.;
Blackwell v. Issequena County Bd. of Educ. & Anguilla Line Consol. School Dist.; Harris v.
Yazoo County Bd. of Educ., Yazoo City Bd. of Educ. & Holly Bluff Line Consol. School Dist.;
Hudson v. Leake County School Bd.; Killingsworth v. Enterprise Consol. School Dist. & Quitman Consol. School Dist.; Magee v. North Pike County Consol. School Dist.; Williams v.
Wilkinson County Bd. of Educ.
4 These included the school systems of Hinds County, Kemper County, Natchez, Marion
County, South Pike County, Neshoba County, Noxubee County, Columbia, Amite County,
Covington County, Lawrence County, Wilkinson County, Lincoln County, Philadelphia and
Franklin County.
5 U.S. Nzws & WoawD REp., Nov. 10, 1969, at 45. In fact, Alexander's impact has
already been felt in several school districts other than the Mississippi systems directly in issue.
In Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970), a
consolidated appeal was taken from school desegregation orders of district courts in Texas,
Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, and Florida, as well as Mississippi. Applying Alexander, the
Fifth Circuit held that since it would be possible to integrate faculties, staff, transportation,
athletics, and other activities during the school term of spring, 1970, but difficult to achieve
a merger of student bodies by that time, a two-step desegregation plan would be implemented.
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More precisely, through Alexander the Court replaced the policy enunciated
in its 1955 decision in Brown v. Board of Education6 [Brown I] of allowing school
desegregation to proceed with "all deliberate speed '" with a "new and much
more rigorous standard: immediate compliance."' Holding that the former
standard "is no longer constitutionally permissible," 9 the Court made absolute
its previously established principle that "the obligation of every school district is
to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and hereafter
only unitary schools."'" In doing so, the Court effectively wrote "a legal end
to the period during which courts have entertained various excuses for failure
to integrate Southern schools.""'
Gone too was judicial tolerance for often endless stages of negotiation
before dual school systems are abolished: the order established the principle
that henceforth all pleas for exceptions to
desegregation may be made
2
only after integration is an established fact.'
This Note will explore the factual background and the judicial history of
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education. It will trace the progress of
that suit through the federal court system, reviewing the arguments propounded
by the litigants and the decisions rendered by the courts at each level. The
Alexander case in itself presents a case study in school desegregation litigation
in the deep South in recent years; the Supreme Court's ultimate disposition of
the suit presents the course such litigation is likely to take in the future."
II. Background

-

A Profile of School Desegregation Litigation
in Mississippi, 1954-68

Fifteen years after the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board
of Education [Brown 1], in which the Court held that racially segregated
public schools violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
"only one of every six black pupils in the South attends a desegregated eleUnder this plan, the first step, which includes merger of faculties and staff, would be accomplished by February 1, 1970; the second step, which includes student body integration, would
be completed by the fall term of 1970. See also Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 38
U.S.L.W. 4219 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1970), where the Supreme Court unanimously held that city
schools in Memphis must institute unitary school systems in accordance with the Alexander
precedent.
6 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7 Id. at 301.
8 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
9 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
10 Id., citing Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234
(1964); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438-39, 442 (1968).
11 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
12 NEWSWEEK, Nov. 10, 1969, at 35.
13 The Alexander decision, however, will not necessarily result in an immediate turnabout
by other reluctant school districts:
The court's pronouncement will not foreclose many delaying options still available to recalcitrant districts. The decision states a blunt principle of law, but it
leaves to lower courts, HEW and the Justice Department the task of sorting out how
to achieve what should, by the law, be instant integration. Aside from the 33 Mississippi districts directly affected by the ruling, other segregated Southern systems
will await pressure from the Administration. Applying such leverage requires time.
TIME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 20.
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mentary or secondary school."' 5 In Mississippi, the6 public schools remained
"totally segregated" for ten years after the decision.2 Mississippi officials, who
initially attempted open defiance of the Court's ruling,' "soon turned to less
obvious - and ingenious - devices for delay."' Among these devices was a
pupil placement law"9 that "established a labyrinth of administrative procedures
to ensnare those Negro students hardy enough to attempt to desegregate white
schools." 2 This law did prevent desegregation for a limited time; in 1963 the
first public school desegregation suits brought in a federal district court in Mississippi were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
placement law. In 1964, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal of these suits, holding that since Mississippi law required segregated
schools, Negro students who had unsuccessfully petitioned school boards for
admission could maintain their actions without using or exhausting the administrative remedies under the placement law.2 On remand, the district court heard
"voluminous testimony [offered] to show that allegedly innate racial differences
furnish a reasonable basis for classifying school children according to race."22
While supporting these allegations, the court felt compelled to order the adoption
of a plan that would have resulted in the desegregation of the Jackson school
system by September, 1969.2" The plaintiffs appealed, urging that this plan's
pace in achieving desegregation was too leisurely. Pending the outcome of their
appeal, plaintiffs applied for injunctive relief from the district court's approval
of the plan. In 1965 the Fifth Circuit granted the injunction. Looking at the
standards of the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare [HEW], which set the fall of 1967 as "the target date for the
extension of desegregation to all grades of school systems not fully desegregated
in 1965-1966 as a qualification for Federal financial assistance ' 25 under title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2" the court held that "a good faith start
requires designation of at least four grades for the 1965-1966 school year."'
If Selma, Alabama, can commence with desegregation of four grades
for 1965-1966, Jackson, Mississippi, can at least catch up. And indeed in
15 UNITED STATES COMW'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 4 (1969) [hereinafter cited as CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT].
16 Brief for Petitioners at 4, Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners].
17 This is illustrated, for instance, by the events recounted in United States v. Barnett, 330
F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1963).
18 Brief for Petitioners at 4. "If one lesson has been learned during these past fifteen years,
it is that the ingenuity of the officials of the Mississippi school system should not be underestimated." Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as Amicus Curiae at 3,
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law].
19 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 6334-01 to -11 (Supp. 1968).
20 Brief for Petitioners at 4.
21 Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 328 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1964).
22 Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.
1966).
23 Id. at 867.
24

Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965).

25 Id. at 730.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964). See note 166 infra.
27 Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 348 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Oir.

1964).
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all but the most exceptional cases, all school districts 2commencing
de8
segregation in fall 1965 should be expected to do as well.
When the actual appeal was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1966, the
court in effect sustained its earlier injunction by holding that the plan approved
by the district court would be sufficient if the public schools complied with the
standards promulgated by the Office of Education, including the objective of
total school desegregation by September of 1967. " In its opinion, the court
referred obliquely to "freedom of choice" as a method of desegregation and
noted that "[a]t this stage [1966] in the history of desegregation in the deep
South a 'freedom of choice['] plan is an acceptable method for a school board
to use in fulfilling its duty to integrate the school system.""0 The United States
Commission on Civil Rights recently described freedom of choice as follows:
Under this method of desegregation, each family with children attending
the public schools must choose the particular school their children will
attend in the following year. White families almost invariably choose to
have their children attend the predominantly white school, and most
Negro families choose to have their children attend the all-black school.
Black parents who wish their children to attend an integrated school must
make this affirmative choice. Although the Supreme Court stated in
Brown II that the burden of desegregation was upon the school boards,
this method of desegregation places a large share of the burden upon those
least able to carry it.31

The Commission's report went on to state that "[o]ne of the primary
reasons school districts undergoing desegregation favor freedom-of-choice plans
is that they do not work." 32 Several reasons for the ineffectiveness of freedom
of choice plans were noted, among them the hostility of local whites toward
desegregation:
Since white families almost always choose to have their children attend
the predominantly white school, the burden of desegregating the schools
in a district falls entirely upon the black families living there. Accordingly,
most Negro families choose to have their children attend the all-black
school, and those few black families who choose to send their children
to the predominantly white school can be -

subjected to pressure and abuse.33

and are

-

singled out and

The report pointed out that in a 1967 study the Commission had found that
violence, threats, and economic reprisals against Negroes who chose to send
their children to white schools led many parents to continue sending their children to the all-black schools.3 "
As a result of these tactics, the desegregation of Mississippi school systems
28
29
1966).
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 731.
Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865, 870 (5th Cir.
Id. at 871.
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT

Id. at 15.
Id. at 20.
Id.

14.
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proceeded at a snail's pace, despite the Supreme Court's declaration in 1964
that "[tlhe time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out." 5 Finally, in the
1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent County," the Supreme
Court, while conceding that freedom of choice might be useful as a means of
desegregation in some circumstances, noted that "the general experience under
'freedom of choice' to date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a
tool of desegregation."sr The Court stated that if a freedom of choice plan
"fails to undo segregation, other means must be used to achieve this end.""
This decision gave new urgency to the "affirmative duty" to desegregate imposed
upon southern school boards by the Fifth Circuit in its 1966 decision in United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education.9 In effect, Green made that
duty immediate. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brennan said
"'The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out ....
' The burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically
to work, and promises realistically to work now."' 0 Specifically, the Court held
that a freedom of choice plan employed in Virginia, which had produced no
white cross-over and only a fifteen percent black cross-over, did not measure
up to constitutional requirements because "[r]ather than further the dismantling of the dual system, the plan has operated simply to burden children
and their parents with a responsibility which Brown 1I placed squarely on the
School Board." 41
III. Alexander's Ascent to the Supreme Court
After the Green decision, district courts throughout the South were besieged with petitions seeking relief 'consistent with the Court's mandate that
school boards adopt a desegregation plan that "promises realistically to work
now." One such petitioner was Mrs. Beatrice Alexander, who filed suit in the
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Board of
Education of Holmes County, Mississippi. Mrs. Alexander, together with eight
other Negro petitioners involved in similar litigation against thirteen other Mississippi school boards, was prepared to show that "the token results achieved
by these [freedom of choice] plans [in the fourteen school districts] were even
less than the results held insufficient in Green. 42 The extent of student desegregation in the fourteen school districts sued by the private plaintiffs is illustrated
43
by the following table:

35 Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964).
36 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
37 Id. at 440; see note 59 infra.
38 Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968), quoting
from Bowman v. County School Bd.of Charles City County, 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 1967)
(concurring opinion).

39 372 F.2d 836, aff'd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966) cert. denied,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
40 Green v. County School Bd.of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968).
41 Id. at 441-42.
42 Brief for Petitioners at 5-6.
43 Id. at 6.
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Percentage of Negroes in
All-Negro Schools

District

Anguilla
Canton
Enterprise
Holly Bluff
Holmes County
Leake County
Madison County
Meridian
North Pike County
Quitman
Sharkey-Issaquena
Wilkinson County
Yazoo
Yazoo County

1968-69*
94.4%
99.5%
84%
97.1%
99.1%

91.4%
99.2%
94.6%
98.1%

Percentage of Negroes in
Predominantly White Schools
1969-70
1969-70
(Projected)
(Projected)
1968-69*
5.6%
3.9%
96.1%
0.1%
0.5%
99.9%
16%
1.1%
98.9%
4.5%
95.5%
95.7%
2.9%
4.3%
0.9%
99.1%
0.9%

84.8%
99.7%
96.1%
93.6%
97.3%
91.2%

93.3%

8.6%
0.8%
5.4%
1.9%

15.2%
0.3%
3.9%
6.4%
2.7%
8.8%
6.7%

These figures are based upon the school districts' reports to the district court.
The projections are based for the most part upon the freedom of choice forms completed
during the spring of 1969, as compiled by the United States and submitted to the court
of appeals.

**

But several district courts, including the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, refused to hear the petitioners' motions, thereby allowing
the 1968-69 school year to begin under the freedom of choice plans then in effect
in those districts. The aggrieved petitioners, Mrs. Alexander among them, consequently applied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for
summary reversal of the district courts' refusal to grant expeditious relief. In
Adams v. Mathews," a decision encompassing over forty cases similar to Mrs.
Alexander's that had been consolidated on appeal, the Fifth Circuit ordered the
district courts to treat these suits "as entitled to the highest priority"45 and to
conduct hearings in each case no later than November 4, 1968, with regard to
(1) whether the school board's existing plan of desegregation is adequate
"to convert [the dual system] to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch" and (2) whether the proposed
changes will result in a desegregation plan that "promises realistically to
work now". An effective plan should produce integration of faculties, staff,
facilities, transportation, and school activities (such as athletics) along with
integration of students.4" (Footnote omitted.)
As a test for determining whether a free choice plan would be acceptable, the
court established this standard:
If in a school district there are still all-Negro schools or only a small
44 403 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968).
45 Id. at 188.
46 Id.
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fraction of Negroes enrolled in white schools, or no substantial integration
of faculties and school activities then, as a matter of law, the existing plan
7
fails to meet constitutional standards as established in GreenY.
On remand from Adams, the District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi consolidated the nine cases brought by the private Negro plaintiffs
with other suits brought by the United States against nineteen additional Mississippi school boards. These cases, including the suit brought by Mrs. Alexander,
proceeded under the caption United States v. Hinds County Board of Education.
Following hearings that began in October, 1968, the district court was
confronted with the problem of whether testimony that had been admitted regarding "(1) alleged disparities between the educational achievement of predominantly white classes and all-Negro classes and (2) community attitudes
concerning desegregation," was relevant in determining the validity of freedom
of choice plans under Green and Adams. Arguing on behalf of the United
States, the Justice Department urged that
Evidence which allegedly discloses disparities in achievement scores of
white and Negro pupils, and expert testimony concerning alleged differences
in the educability of children according to race, have repeatedly been held
by the Court of Appeals to be irrelevant and immaterial to the consideration
of whether a school district is meeting its constitutional obligations ...
The sole purpose of such evidence and testimony is to justify the continuation of dual systems of schools based on race. The defendants seek by
this evidence and their experts... to maintain the status-quo in the face of
their constitutional
duty to disestablish their racially segregated system of
49
schools.
The Justice Department further noted that the Supreme Court has held that
community attitudes toward desegregation, e.g., attitudes evidenced by a mass
exodus of whites from public schools that become "too" integrated, are likewise
immaterial.50
Applying the Adams test51 to the facts before the district court, the Justice
Department, though suggesting that the test is disjunctive and that failure of one
of its parts is a failure of the entire test,5" advocated that "each of the defendants
.
fails all of the parts" because
*

No white child attends a predominantly Negro school in any of the
defendant districts.
No defendant comes even close to that percentage of pupil integration
which ... the Supreme Court found inadequate in Green ....
No defendant approaches the ratio of faculty integration ordered for the
47 Id.
48 Brief for Plaintiff at 6, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(j)

(S.D. Miss., May 13, 1969).
49 Id. at 11-12.
50

Id. at 13, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358

52

Brief for Plaintiff at 16, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(j)

U.S. 1 (1958); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968).
51 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
(S.D. Miss., May 13, 1969).
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present year by the Court of Appeals in Montgomery County Board of Education v. Carr". ...

In none of defendant's districts does a predominantly white school
compete against an all-Negro school in athletics or any other type of
endeavor. The records . . . are replete with evidence of overlapping bus

54
routes and resulting transportation segregation.

The district court did not agree with the government's analysis of the issues.
Though acknowledging that the cases were before it on motions to "update the
Jefferson decree 5 in all of these cases to comport with the requirements of
Green,"56 the court in an unreported opinion on May 13, 1969, approved the
freedom of choice plans for all of the defendant school districts. Insisting that
"[i]t is incumbent upon the plaintiffs... to show a lack of substantial progress
toward the disestablishment of a dual school system and the establishment of a
unitary school system of both races,"' the court held that, as a matter of law,
plaintiffs had failed to satisfy this burden.5 1 Citing Green to uphold the freedom of choice plans,"5 the court went on to praise the efforts of the defendants:
The facts and circumstances in practically all of these cases... show this
Court to its entire satisfaction that these schools, operating under the freedom of choice plan, have operated in the very best of good faith with the
Court in an honest effort to comply with and conform to all of the requirements of the [Jefferson] decree. 0
The court was unable to find a single instance where "any colored parent, or
colored child did not do exactly what they wanted to do in deciding as to the
school which the colored child would attend."'" Moreover, the court felt that the
plans used offered the best means of implementing the wishes of white and black
children alike:
The vast majority of colored children simply do not wish to attend a school
which is predominantly white, and white children simply do not wish to
attend a school which is predominantly Negro, and that ingrained and
53

400 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'd sub noa. United States v. Montgomery County Bd.

of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).

54 Id. at 16-17.
55 The district court looked upon the decree in United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, 372 F.2d 836, aff'd on rehearing en bar-, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967), as "the model decree for the establishment of a unitary school
system as such plan was designed and approved by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit en banc." United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) at 5
(S.D. Miss., May 13, 1969).
56 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) at 5 (S.D. Miss., May 13,
1969).
57 Id. at 7.
58 Id. at 13.
59 Id. at 9. The court based its holding on the following passage from Green:
Although the general experience under "freedom of choice" to date has been such
as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation, there may well be instances
in which it can serve as an effective device. Where it offers real promise of aiding a
desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a
unitary, nonracial system there might be no objection to allowing such a device to
prove itself in operation. Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430, 440-41 (1968).
60 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) at 9 (S.D. Miss., May 13,
1969).
61 Id. at 10.
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inbred influence and characteristic of the races will
not be changed by any
62
pseudo teachers, or sociologists in judicial robes.
The district court supported its finding that the boards had not been r&niss in
their duties by citing difficulties caused by a provision in the Jefferson decree that
"[a]t no time shall any official, teacher, or employee of the school system influence any parent, or other adult person serving as a parent, or any student, in the
exercise of a choice or favor or penalize any person because of the choice made.""
In the court's version of the hearings, "[e]very school official .. .. in every
testified convincingly.., that this provision... had interone of these cases
fered with a fair and just and proper operation of the freedom of choice plan in
these schools."" Thus, from the court's standpoint, the school boards themselves
were not to blame for the statistics that showed a largely dual school system.
Rather, the court asseverated, the responsibility should fall on the Fifth Circuit,
the progenitor of the Jefferson decree and its troublesome provision:
The Court finds from such circumstances and conditions that the mathematical statistics as to the working progress of the freedom of choice plan...
has not failed. The
is unfair, unjust, unrealistic and misleading. The plan
Court [of Appeals] just has not allowed it to work.65
Shortly after the district court's May thirteenth ruling, the petitioners and
the United States moved the court of appeals for summary reversal or, in the
alternative, for expedited consideration of the cases. On June 25, 1969, this
motion was granted, and oral argument was set for July 2. Again. the action
proceeded under the caption United States v. Hinds County School Board, and
consolidated under this heading were the same cases adjudicated by the district
court, including Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education. In its brief
for the petitioners, the Justice Department marshalled statistical data to support
its charge that the district court's approval of the defendants' free choice plans
contravened the Supreme Court's decision in Green and the direct mandate of the
Fifth Circuit in Adams v. Mathews. The Department contended that:
1. Each of the defendant school districts maintained all Negro
schools; 66 from a total of 165 schools were all black. Not one white
student had ever attended a traditionally Negro school in any of the
districts.66 The following table 7 shows the racial character of the schools
in each district:
62 Id. at 15.
63

Id. at 8, quoting from United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,

898, aff'd on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840

(1967).

64 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) at 8 (S.D. Miss., May 13,
1969).
65 Id. at 12. As to the matter of faculty integration under the free choice plans, the court
found that "[the evidence in this record does not show one single instance where there has
been any discrimination on the part of any school authority in hiring teachers." Id. at 17. The
court did add, however, that a target date for faculty desegregation must be set by a plan and
must be met pursuant to orders of the Fifth Circuit in previous cases. Id. at 21, citing, United
States v. Board of Educ. of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406 F.2d 1086, 1093-94 (5th Cir. 1969).
66 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 5, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d
i
852 (5th Cir. 1969).
67 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 855 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969).
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RACIAL CHARACTER
AllTotalNumber
Negro
of Schools
District
Amite
2
5
3
Canton
5
1
4
Columbia
7
Covington
3
1
Forrest
9
1
Franklin
3
10
22
Hinds
5
Kemper
2
1
5
Lauderdale
Lawrence
2
7
3
7
Leake
6
2
Lincoln
4
8
Madison
1
Marion
5
8
19
Meridian
7
15
Natchez-Adams
1
2
Neshoba
1
4
North Pike
3
6
Noxubee
1
3
Philadelphia
4
5
Sharkey-lssaqueiaa
2
3
Anguilla-Line
2
7
South Pike
4
2
Wilkinson

AllWhite
1
1
2
1
1
2
3
3
3
2

Predominantly
White
2
2
3
3
6
2
11
2
2
2
1
4
2
11
8
1

2
1

1
3
1
1
1
5
2

2. More than 96 percent of the Negro students in these districts
continued to attend traditionally black schools. Students in two districts
were completely segregated by race, and the largest percentage of Negroes
attending formerly all-white schools was only 10.6 percent.6" School
activities also remained segregated; black and white schools did not compete in athletics in any of the districts. 9 The following table 0 shows the
total enrollment by race for the 1968-69 school year in each district and
the number and percentage of Negroes attending traditionally white
schools:
Negroes in White Schools
1968-1969 Enrollment
Percentage
Number
White
Negro
District
2.5
54
1,554
2,542
Amite
.5
18
1,370
3,786
Canton
6.8
62
1,495
912
Columbia
5.3
89
2,031
1,673
Covington
10.6
112
4,281
1,035
Forrest
3.5
39
1,109
1,110
Franklin
5.9
441
6,521
7,536
Hinds
.1
3
801
2,019
Kemper
1.3
24
3,148
1,872
Lauderdale
68 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 7, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1969).
69 Id.
70 Id.
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Lawrence
Leake
Lincoln
Madison
Marion
Meridian
Natchez-Adams
Neshoba
North Pike
Noxubee
Philadelphia
Sharkey-Issaquena
Anguilla-Line
South Pike
Wilkinson

NOTE

1,278
2,265
1,001
3,250
1,435
4,693
5,927
870
617
3,492
533
2,087
640
2,126
2,817

1,856
2,142
1,612
1,240
2,165
6,553
4,494

2,035
707
895
959
712
226
1,045
787

3. Less than 3 percent of the teachers in the defendant systems
were employed on a full-time basis in schools of the opposite race. Seven
districts had less than one full-time teacher per school assigned across
racial lines. In the remaining systems, less than 1 percent of the faculties
taught in schools in which their race was in the minority."' The following
table'2 shows the total number of full-time and part-time teachers in each
district and the number of teachers assigned across racial lines:
Full-& parttime teachers
District
Negro
White
Amite
95
66
Canton
120
81
Columbia
43
71
Covington
64
103
Forrest
43
122
Franklin
44
45
Hinds
295
281.9
45
Kemper
68
Lauderdale
82
131
81
Lawrence
50
90
Leake
87
Lincoln
38
74
66
Madison
147
96
Marion
48
317
Meridian
180
Natchez-Adams
Neshoba
35
North Pike
26
Noxubee
135
Philadelphia 25
SharkeyIssaquena
71
31

Full-time desegregating teachers
Negro
White
0
0
3
11
5
4
3
3
4
3
3
4
22
0
0
1
8
3
10
4
0
3
0
0
0
8
4
6
8
17
0
0
0
3
1
2
6
1
0
0

Part-time desegregating teachers
Negro
White
0
0
1
9
0
4
1
5
1
2
1
1

Anguilla-Line
South Pike
Wilkinson

78
97

52.8
39

71

Id. at 10.

72

United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 857 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
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4. The record in each case contained illustrations of how the dual
character of the particular schools might be eliminated by other methods
of desegregation, such as zoning and pairing. "Thus," concluded the
Justice Department, "the continued existence of all-Negro schools is not
defendants' educational systems
attributable to any factors extraneous to
73
and is fully within their responsibility."
Buttressed by this empirical data, the United States importuned the court of
appeals to find as a matter of law that, in view of Green and Adams, the district
court's ruling was "clearly erroneous" and therefore
freedom of choice must be abandoned in favor of some other plan "that
promises realistically to work and promises realistically to work now." ...
[I]t is abundantly clear that freedom of choice cannot be used since it has
i.e., the job of convertnot done the job that is constitutionally7 required,
4
ing a dual system into a unitary system.
Moreover, since the district court in its May thirteenth opinion had admitted its
"utter incompetence" in the field of school administration, s the government
requested the court of appeals to remand the case with instructions to the district
court that the assistance of experts from the Office of Education be sought "on
an expedited basis" to help the defendants formulate "educationally sound, administratively feasible" desegregation plans that would provide for conversion to
unitary, nonracial systems for the 1969-70 school year."0
In an opinion rendered on July 3, 1969, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the
government's allegation that the free choice plans were constitutionally inadequate. The court noted the total absence of white enrollment in black schools,
the token enrollment of blacks in white schools, and the projected enrollment
statistics for the 1969-70 school year, which augured little progress." Looking
at the districts sued by the private plaintiffs, the court saw that the highest percentage of Negro cross-over to white schools was "16 percent . ..a degree of
desegregation held to be inadequate in Green."'8 Similarly taking cognizance
of the continued segregation of school activities and faculties in the defendant
school districts,79 the court was forced to hold that "[t]hese facts indicate that
these cases fall squarely within the decisions of the Supreme Court in Green
and its companion cases and the decisions of this Court,"8' 0 and that "[t]he
proper conclusion to be drawn from these facts is clear from the mandate of
73 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 6, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1969).
74 Id. at 9-10, quoting from United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist.,
406 F.2d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir. 1969).
75 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Civil No. 4075(J) at 15 (S.D. Miss., May
13, 1969).
76 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 13-14, United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417
F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1969).
77 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 855-56 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969).
78 Id. at 855.
79 Id. at 855-57.
80 Id. at 856, citing United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School Dist., 406
F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1969); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d
682 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School Dist., 410 F.2d
626 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Adams v. Math s ... : 'as a matter of law, the existing plan fails to meet
constitutional standards as established in Green. "'I
The July third decision decreed that the defendant school districts "will
no longer be able to rely on freedom of choice as the method for disestablishing
their dual school systems," 2 meaning that alternative methods of desegregation,
such as zoning and pairing, would be required to eliminate the dual character
of the schools.8" Acceding to the government's suggestion, the court enjoined
the defendants to collaborate with HEW experts from the Office of Education
in the preparation of plans to disestablish the dual systems in question. The
plans, which were to be effectuated with the beginning of the 1969-70 school
year, were to cover "student and faculty assignment, school bus routes if transportation is provided, all facilities, all athletic and other school activities, and
all school location and construction activities."8 4 The court set August 11,
1969, as the deadline for submission of the plans to the district court and August
27, 1969, as the date for actual implementation of the plans." In its modified
order of July 25, 1969, however, the court of appeals moved the implementation
date back to September 1, 1969.
On August 11, 1969, the date established by the Fifth Circuit for the submission of the new plans, the Office of Education submitted desegregation plans
for the thirty-three school boards to the district courts. Thirty of the thirtythree plans provided for implementation of pairing and/or zoning at the start of
the 1969-70 school year." The three exceptions were plans.for Hinds County,
Holmes County, and Meridian, which asserted that problems peculiar to those
districts required postponing full implementation until the beginning of the
1970-71 school year 8 In a letter to the district court on August 11, 1969, the
then director of the Equal Opportunities Division of the Office of Education,
Dr. Gregory R. Anrig, gave his evaluation of the HEW plans:
81
82
83
84
85
86

United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 856 ,(5th Cir. 1969).
Id.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 858-59.
Brief for Petitioners at 12.
A number of respondent school boards exercised their option to file alternative
plans . ...
These plans fall roughly into 3 categories.
First, some boards proposed the implementation of a "tracking" system, whereby
students would be given achievement tests and, on that basis, assigned to one of two
schools - a school for bright students or a school for the others. Formerly white
schools would serve students scoring in the top 25% of their class, and Negro schools
would serve the other students. The boards proposed that they be given three years
to implement the plans, so that during the 1969-70 school year only grades 1-4 would
be "desegregated" through achievement testing, while freedom of choice remained in
effect in those grades not yet reached.
I Second, some boards proposed geographic zoning or pairing plans, with achievement test results being used for student assignments within each school. Thus, there
would be two first grades in each school: one for bright students and one for the
others.
Third, some boards proposed plans provided [sic] for continued use of freedom of
choice, but assuring that a substantial percentage of the enrollment of formerly allwhite schools would be Negro through administrative assignments. These plans did
not provide for the assignment of whites to Negro schools.
Id. at 12 n.11. Of course, all of the plans submitted first had to be accepted by the district
court before they could be implemented.
87 Id. at 12 n.12.
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I believe that each of the enclosed plans is educationally and administratively sound, both in terms of substance and in terms of timing. In the
cases of Hinds County, Holmes County and Meridian, the plans that we
recommend provide for full implementation with the beginning of the
1970-71 school year. The principal reasons for this delay are construction,
and the numbers of pupils and schools involved. In all other cases, the
plans that we have prepared and that we recommend to the Court provide
for complete disestablishment of the dual school system at the beginning
of the 1969-70 school year.ss

Despite the ostensible soundness of the HEW plans, on August 19, 1969,
there occurred what some have called "a major retreat in the struggle to achieve
meaningful school desegregation."" On that date HEW Secretary Robert Finch
sent a letter to Judge William Harold Cox, Chief Judge of the District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi, requesting that the plans HEW had submitted to the district court on August eleventh be withdrawn and that HEW
be given until December 1, 1969, to submit new plans, implementation of those
plans being left to an "unspecified future time."'
Secretary Finch did not dispute Dr. Anrig's opinion that the plans were "educationally and administratively
sound,"'" but feared that the immediate implementation of the plans on September first for the 1969-70 school year would create "administrative and logistical
difficulties" that would "produce chaos, confusion, and a catastrophic educational setback" 92 to the many thousands of school children, black and white alike,
in the affected districts. In his letter, the secretary confided that he was "gravely
concerned that the time allowed for the development of these terminal plans
has been much too short for the educators of the Office of Education to develop
terminal plans which can be implemented this year.""3 Consequently, in order that
the anticipated pitfalls might be obviated by further consideration and refinement
of the plans, he felt constrained to ask for the delay, even though this would have
the undesirable side effect of postponing desegregation in the thirty-three districts for another year.
88 Id. at 13.
89 United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Statement of the Commissioners on Federal
Enforcement of School Desegregation at 2, Sept. 11, 1969.
90 Brief for Petitioners at 13-14; CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N REPORT 54.
91 Dr. Anrig himself never deviated from that view and declined to testify in support of
Secretary Finch's position at the district court hearing on August 25, 1969. Brief for National
Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 8, Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S.
19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief for NEA].
92 Letter from Robert H. Finch, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, to William
Harold Cox, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Aug. 19, 1969, in United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Nos. 28030 & 28042 at 14 (5th
Cir., Aug. 28, 1969) (exhibit no. 2).
93 Id.
When looked at in gross the fixed deadline had seemed feasible. When looked at in
detail by the Secretary, however, he concluded there were too many unresolved problems to leave it possible for him to feel conscientiously that he could approve the
plans. Much experience shows that desegregation plans are more effective, are more
readily accepted and carried out, when there is some opportunity for preparation of
the community, and particularly when the details of the plans can be explained to the
teachers involved, and their support enlisted. Memorandum for the United States on
Motion to Vacate the August 28, 1969, Order of the Fifth Circuit at 4-5, Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Education, 396 U.S. 1218 (Black, Circuit Justice, 1969) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum for the United States on Motion to Vacate the August 28, 1969, Order of the
Fifth Circuit].
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Though still involved in Mississsippi school desegregation suits,9 and though
troubled from within by lawyers from the Civil Rights Division protesting the
Nixon administration's seeming retreat on the school desegregation issue,s the
Justice Department proceeded to take the steps necessary to make HEW's proposed delay a reality. The United States Attorney General filed a motion in
the court of appeals on August 21, 1969, seeking modification of the court's
July 3, 1969, order to make it comport with the suggestions contained in the
secretary's letter. The private Negro plaintiffs, seeking to preserve the September
1, 1969, implementation date established by the Fifth Circuit in its order of
July third, filed objections t6 the department's motion, thus laying the foundation
for the showdown between these plaintiffs and the government that was to
climax before the Supreme Court.9" On August 22, 1969, the court of appeals
orally granted leave to the district court to hear the motion for the extension,
and on August twenty-fifth this hearing was held. The gist of what transpired
at that time is set forth in the petitioners' brief in Alexander:
The delay was to be used for "the in depth peripheral studies such
as curricular studies and financial studies required to implement these new
plans" . . . . Moreover, the delay "would allow collaboration between the
Office of Education and the defendant school districts to prepare for implementation of the terminal plans, thus resulting in better education and
better community relations and consequently, an effective, workable desegregation of the defendant school districts and the conversion from a
dual to a unitary system" ....
Although the letter of the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had referred to "administrative and logistical'difficulties"
requiring delay ... no particular difficulty with respect to any particular
school system was presented to, or found by, the district court. Instead, the
district court found only the generalized and long anticipated need to redraw bus routes, reassign teachers, convert classrooms, adjust curricula
and engage in "faculty and student preparation, including various meetings
and discussions and the solutions therefor ....
.1
On August 26, 1969, the district court, perhaps not surprisingly, recommended
94 See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Though the Fifth Circuit had decided the
cases before it on July 3, 1969, the Justice Department was still responsible for seeing that the
defendant school boards carried out the plans ordered for implementation on September 1,
1969.
95 It was reported that the equivocal nature of the Nixon administration's July 3, 1969,
policy statement on school desegregation (see note 164 infra) coupled with the petition for
further delay contained in Secretary Finch's August nineteenth letter, led many disillusioned
lawyers within the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division to protest the administration's
policy concerning school desegregation. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1969, at 1, col. 8; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 28, 1969, at 1, col. 4. The chief of the Civil Rights Division, Jerris Leonard,
defended the administration's stand, calling its critics "a lot of people who are fran1dy running
off at the mouth." N.Y. Tomes, Oct. 3, 1969, at 25, col. 1. In fact, Mr. Leonard went so
far as to fire the leader of the dissidents, Gary Greenberg, who reportedly "refused to compromise his views while arguing a desegregation suit against an Arkansas school district."
Tibin, Oct. 31, 1969, at 77.
96 When the private plaintiffs objected to HEW's request for the delay, the Justice Department found itself in something of a dilemma. Up to that point, it had been actively prosecuting the Mississippi school boards alongside the individual plaintiffs in consolidated actions;
once it sided with HEW, however, it parted paths with the privately instituted companion
cases and was forced to put its desegregation efforts in abeyance until the litigation over the
delay question had been settled.
97 Brief for Petitioners at 15-16.
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to the court of appeals that the government's motion for delay be granted.9"
On August twenty-eighth the Fifth Circuit granted the motion to extend
99
in an unreported decision titled United States v. Hinds County School Board,
under which were again consolidated Alexander and the other school desegregation cases included in the court's July third order. Specifically, the Fifth Circuit
withdrew September 1, 1969, as the final implementation date for the disestablishment of the dual school systems and substituted December 1, 1969, as
the deadline for the submission of new plans to the district court,"0 "with implementation to be left to a later date."''" The court tacked a condition onto the
extension, however, namely, that the plan as finally approved must promise
"significant action" toward abolition of the dual systems during the 1969-70
school year.' 2 The court in addition requested reports from the Office of Education by October 1, 1969, on each of the school boards' programs to "prepare
its faculty and staff for the conversion from the dual to the unitary system."' 0'
Quickly reacting to this turn of events, on August 30, 1969, Beatrice
Alexander and her fellow private plaintiffs applied to Mr. Justice Black, acting
as Circuit Justice, for a stay of the Fifth Circuit's August twenty-eighth order
and a reinstatement of its July third order. On September fifth, though realizing
that the delay meant that another school year might elapse under freedom of
choice, Mr. Justice Black reluctantly denied the application because he felt
that he could not say definitely that the full Court would grant the relief sought,
though he believed there was a "strong possibility" that it would. 04 Stating that
it was "deplorable" to him to uphold the Fifth Circuit's August twenty-eighth
ruling, he confided:
This conclusion does not comport with my ideas of what ought to be
done in this case when it comes before the entire Court. I hope these
applicants will present the issue to the full Court at the earliest possible
opportunity. I would then hold that there are no longer any justiciable
issues in the question of making effective not only promptly but at once now - orders sufficient to vindicate the rights of any pupil in the United

98
99
100
1969).
101

Id. at 16.
Nos. 28030 & 28042 (5th Cir., Aug. 28, 1969).
United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Nos. 28030 & 28042 at 7 (5th Cir., Aug. 28,

Brief for Petitioners at 17.
When HEW's plans were withdrawn, nothing filled their place. All of the districts
affected will therefore continue using their old freedom-of-choice plans. At no time
in the hearing on the Justice Department's motion for extension of time was any
evidence presented that the continued use of freedom-of-choice would result in meaningful school desegregation during the 1969-70 school year. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM'N
REPORT 55.
102 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Nos. 28030 & 28042 at 9 (5th Cir., Aug.
28, 1969).
Although the Fifth Circuit required that the districts must take "significant
action" to desegregate before the end of the 1969-70 school year, the courts have
traditionally been reluctant to order far-reaching desegregation during the course of a
school year. It is not, therefore, likely that meaningful desegregation will occur
before the start of the 1970-71 school year. CIVIL RIGHTS COMMa'N REPORT 55.
103 United States v. Hinds County School Bd., Nos. 28030 & 28042 at 8 (5th Cir., Aug.
28, 1969).
104 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1221 (Black, Circuit Justice,
1969).
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States who is effectively excluded from a public school on account of his
race or color."' 5
Having previously asserted that the phrase "all deliberate speed" was "only a
soft euphemism for delay,"'0 8 Justice Black concluded:
It has been 15 years since we declared in Brown I that a law which
prevents a child from going to a public school because of his. color violates
the Equal Protection Clause. As this record conclusively shows, there are
many places still in this country where the schools are either "white" or
"Negro" and not just schools for all children as the Constitution requires.
In my opinion there is no reason why such a wholesale deprivation of constitutional rights should be tolerated another minute. I fear that this long
denial of constitutional rights is due in large part to the phrase07"with all
deliberate speed." I would do away with that phrase completely'
The private plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari was filed September
23, 1969, and granted by the Supreme Court on October 9, 1969.0' The nine
consolidated cases were to proceed under the name Alexander u. Holmes County
to that decision itself we now turn.
Board of Education"9
-

IV. The Arguments Before the Supreme Court
The petitioners in Alexander were represented by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense Fund; the United States by Solicitor General Erwin Griswold and Assistant Attorney General Jerris Leonard, chief of the Justice Department's Civil
Rights Division. The respondent school boards' position was argued by Mr.
John C. Satterfield of Mississippi. Amicus curiae briefs were filed by the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and by the National Education Association. A consideration of some of the points raised in the briefs submitted to
the Court will serve to isolate the issues involved in Alexander and should contribute to a better understanding of the decision itself."0
According to the petitioners, the United States government, in authorizing
and supporting Secretary Finch's August nineteenth letter requesting delay in
the desegregation of thirty-three Mississippi school districts, became "an apologist
for delay" and an abettor of an inflexible district court that "repeatedly took
unwarranted delays in hearing and determining the cases, approved obviously
inadequate plans of desegregation, and went so far as to persistently harass civil
Denouncing the defendant school districts as "adopting the
rights lawyers.""'
105 Id. at 1222.
106 Id. at 1219.
107 Id. at 1222.
108 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.,, 396 U.S. 802 (1969). The respondents'
cross-petition for certiorari was denied. Id.
109 The former caption used in these cases, United States u. Hinds County School Board,
was no longer appropriate following the Fifth Circuit's grant of the government's request for
delay, because this order was excepted to only by the private plaintiffs and not, obviously, by
the United States.
110 Independent consideration of the brief submitted by Mr. Satterfield and Judge A. F.
Summer, the Attorney General of Mississippi, has been omitted. This brief focused primarily
on the broad school desegregation problem, rather than on the narrow issue of whether a
delay should have been granted by the court of appeals.
Comm'N REPORT 39-46.
111 Brief for Petitioners at 18, 19-20; cf. Crv= RarTs
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trappings of desegregation rather than the substance, and . . . implementing
successful tactics for delay,""' 2 they urged that the only way to end dual school
systems was for the Court to make it "unmistakably clear that there can be no
more delays" and called upon the Court to "act to discourage recalcitrant school
boards from seeking refuge from desegregation in protracted litigation."" In
other words, they exhorted, "integration, not segregation, must be the status quo
pendente lite."" 4 Stressing the easily remediable nature of the "logistical and
administrative difficulties" referred to by Secretary Finch in his letter" 5 and the
lengthy period of anticipation preceding them, the petitioners expostulated:
"In this sorry chronicle of footdragging by these school boards and the district
court, the last thing that was needed was the federal government's own initiative
for delay.""' 6 These charges were substantiated, the petitioners felt, by the reports submitted to the district court on October 1, 1969, by the Office of Education on the progress of the local school boards toward devising programs to prepare faculty and staff for disestablishment of the dual systems. In the petitioners' words, the reports indicated that the government's "initiative for delay"
had indeed produced the "predictable effect of inspiring the local boards to
adopt a more resistant position" and showed that "the delay has produced nothing of educational significance.""' 7 The petitioners consequently argued:
This record . . . reveals that, notwithstanding the Solicitor General's
statement to the Court that the law is clear that "school boards today
are constitutionally obligated to devise and implement plans that will
accomplish [disestablishment] now" . . . the law is apparently not clear
to the respondent school boards, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, the Department of Justice, the district court and the Court
of Appeals. This Court must therefore make unmistakably clear that there
are to be no more delays:
No more delays to solve "administrative and logistical difficulties";
No more delays to promote "better community relations";
No more delays for "faculty and student preparation, including
various meetings and discussions of the problems to be presented and
the solutions therefor."
This is the only rule of law which will effectively disestablish the
dual school systems: 15 years is enough to solve administrative problems.
This is the only rule of law which will effectively deal with the
problem of evasion: 15 years is enough to tolerate defiance of the Constitution." 8 (Footnote omitted.)
Furthermore, continued the petitioners, in order to make administrative
and judicial enforcement of desegregation work, the Court must not only make
it clear that the time for delay has run out, but must also act to shift the burden
of litigation from Negro school children to the school boards themselves by re112 Brief for Petitioners at 18.
113 Id.
114 Id. Of course, this corresponded with the Court's ultimate holding: "Its basic message
was integrate now, litigate later." N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
115 See text accompanying note 97 supra.
116 Brief for Petitioners at 20.
117 Id. at 22.
118 Id. at 23-24.
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quiring that integration, not segregation, be the status quo during litigation."'
The petitioners proposed that the principles to govern the Court in fashioning
this kind of relief were well expressed in Mr. Justice Black's September fifth
opinion on the petitioners' motion to stay the Fifth Circuit's August twenty-eighth
order granting the delay.' ° The petitioners concluded their argument with this
analysis of the broad school desegregation problem:
We are now at the turning point in the history of school desegregation.
Forceful and decisive action taken now by this Court can rally the lower
courts and the executive to finish the process of school desegregation begun
15 years ago. Retreat at this critical juncture would pose a threat to the
rule of law this Nation could ill afford.
Fortunately, the task is amenable to judicial solution. What is needed
is to excise from the law earlier-tolerated justifications for delay and to
assert the traditional equity function of the federal courts in such a way
as to discourage, once and for all,2 resort to protracted litigation as a safe
haven for the dual school system.' '
The United States answered these arguments in a memorandum filed in
opposition to the petition for certiorari 22 and in a supplemental memorandum
filed after certiorari was granted. 21 In the first memorandum, the government
reasoned that since the desegregation plans to be formulated by HEW were
not to be submitted until December 1, 1969, "flit cannot now be known whether
petitioners will deem any of the provisions of these plans to be unsatisfactory in
any respect."'' Observing that the crux of the petitioners' complaint was that
the revocation of the September first deadline permitted the current school year
to begin under the "constitutionally inadequate" freedom of choice plans, 2 ' the
government simply remarked that "the clock cannot be turned back so as to
begin the school year in any other way." '26 In its view, the pertinent question
was not
whether, in the extremely difficult circumstances of late summer, the court
below should or should not have granted the extension of time deemed
necessary by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in order to
enable his Department realistically and responsibly to make up for the
tragic and frustrating default of the local school officials in these districts by doing the work
which it was their obligation under the Consti27
tution to have done.
119 Id. at 25. Such relief, according to the petitioners, is within the traditional power of a
court of equity since
it is inherent in the nature of the judicial process that one side or the other shall be
protected in its position while litigation is going on toward the end of determining
the parties' ultimate rights. What a court of equity must ask itself is whether the
one party or the other should be put at this risk? Id. at 27-28.
120 Id. at 26; see text accompanying notes 105, 107 supra.
121 Brief for Petitioners at 33.
122 Memorandum for United States on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Alexander v. Holmes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
123 Supplemental Memorandum for United States on Writ of Certiorari, Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
124 Memorandum for United States on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
125 Id. at 6.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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Rather, the question was "how, in the present circumstances, the overriding
objective of these lawsuits, to which the United States is firmly dedicated, can
be successfully and expeditiously achieved."' 28 The government's sentiment
was that
the order of the court of appeals - formulated in the light of that court's
close familiarity with these cases and distinguished experience in this field
constitutes an appropriate answer to this question. Petitioners do not
suggest how the order could be improved or how, in any other respect, the
objectives of these lawsuits would be furthered
by this Court's review of
1 29
the order at the present stage of these cases.
Accordingly, the government proposed that the Court either deny
the application for certiorari or else withhold action on the application until the
situation "clarified" after the scheduled filing of the plans on December 1,
1969.130
After certiorari was granted, the United States filed a supplemental memorandum maintaining that even though it read Green as having held that "the
time of gradual accommodation is ended" and that "today no unnecessary delay
is tolerable,"' 3 ' still the court of appeals' order ought not be overturned because
The fact remains ... that desegregation does not occur automatically
and that disestablishment of a dual school system is often a somewhat
complicated process. That is why a plan is usually necessary, and, unavoidably,
a plan requires some time to formulate and some time to implement.1 2
The logical conclusion, said the government, was that "it is simply unreal to
talk about instantaneous desegregation";"' even accepting the Green mandate
that desegregation must be accomplished both "realistically" and "now," the
formulation and implementation of a workable plan necessarily requires "several
weeks of informed effort."" 4 Again noting that the time elapsed since the Fifth
Circuit's order could not be recaptured," 5 the government disapproved of the
petitioners' proposition that the Supreme Court order back into effect the
plans submitted by the Office of Education on August eleventh.
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, whose Department
wrote the plans, states that he needs additional time to study and perhaps
correct or refine them, before he can give his approval. At present, then,
the plans are not vouched for by the government's experts, and are not
fully developed. Nor have the affected school boards had an opportunity
to present their objections .... And, of course, the courts below have had
no occasion to consider the plans." 6 (Footnote omitted.)
128 Id. at 7.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Supplemental Memorandum for United States on Writ of Certiorari at 2, Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
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Id.
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Id. at 5.
Id. at 5-6.
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In concluding, the United States took cognizance oi the need for significant,
prompt action iii school desegregation but reiterated its belief that the relief
sought was inappropriate.
As a general proposition, we agree that the burden should be shifted
from the school children to the school boards. The history set forth in
petitioners' brief shows the need for depriving the school boards of further
incentive for delay. This does not mean, however, that all other educational and administrative considerations must be set aside. For many of
the still segregated school systems the "varied local school problems" recognized in Brown I have not been eliminated by the passage of fifteen
years. And, at all events, the relief proposed by petitioners seems particularly out of place in these cases at this time, since the plans on file are
not fully developed and the outstanding order1s7of the court of appeals
requires final plans to be submitted imminently.
In its brief as amicus curiae, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law scrutinized the "administrative and logistical difficulties" pleaded
in Secretary Finch's letter and found them "wholly inadequate" to support the
requested delay:
The Secretary's reference is to the defendant's assertion that the petitioners' constitutional rights must await (1) the redrawing of bus routes,
(2) the reassignment of teachers, (3) the conversion of classrooms and
(4) a program of preparation of the teachers and students involved.1 83
This fourth ground appears to be a euphemism for overcoming community
resistance.
The supposed administrative and logistical difficulties asserted in support of the request for a further delay are wholly inadequate, particularly
in the light of the long delay already encountered. There is nothing in the
record to demonstrate that the redrawing of bus routes could take more
than a few days. Even assuming that the second and third reasons (reassignment of teachers and the conversion of classrooms) will involve
difficulties of substance for the school boards involved, it is scarcely credible
that they outweigh the long overdue promise of equality or that these supposed difficulties cannot be adequately resolved after desegregation has been
achieved. 8 9 (Footnotes omitted.)
Regarding the fourth ground, the committee attacked a statement by
Jerris Leonard that delay was in order because of widespread community resistance to integration and because of the Justice Department's lack of sufficient
manpower to enforce an order demanding immediate desegregation. 14 The
137 Id. at 6.
138 These were the findings of fact given by the district,court in its August 26, 1969,
opinion recommending that the government's request for delay be granted by the Fifth Circuit. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
139 Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 3-4.

140 Id. at 5.

The chief of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division said . . . that if the
Supreme Court should rule ... that schools must integrate immediately throughout
the South the order could not be enforced.
Referring to an appeal that the Court has already agreed to consider on an
accelerated schedule, Jerris Leonard, an Assistant Attorney General, declared that
"if the Court were to order instant integration nothing would change. Somebody
would have to enforce that order."
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committee observed that "neither of these arguments is sufficient or even cognizable by the courts" 14' but nevertheless offered "to assist in the recruitment of
the services of as many volunteer attorneys as may be needed by the Department
for the purpose of enforcement of desegregation orders in these and other
cases. ' .".2 (Footnote omitted.)
The other group supporting the petitioners in an amicus curiae brief was
the National Education Association [NEA], which also felt that the difficulties
asserted in the Finch letter were not "sufficiently significant to justify delay. '1"4 3
The tasks referred to by the HEW witnesses should together require
a week or, at most, two weeks to complete. Where a school district could
not complete the necessary work in the available time, the district court
could have ordered a short delay in scheduled school opening. But there
are no educational reasons - presented or existing - which would support
a year's delay in effecting desegregation. Educators in the Office of Education concluded, after intensive investigations, that none of the districts here
involved have sound reasons for delaying implementation of the plans
submitted. There is nothing in this record to suggest that that conclusion
was incorrect.1 44 (Footnote omitted.)
Supporting the need for quick action, the NEA brief pointed out the "enormous
and irreparable injury" 4 ' that segregated education imposes on black children:
First, there is the psychological damage to the black student, recognized
by this Court in 1954, flowing from official maintenance of separate black
schools.14 61Second, it is established that black children, particularly in the
South, are substantially less able to learn in an environment of racial isolation than in an integrated educational setting.[14'] Third, some school districts
across the South still provide facilities for black students that are markedly
further reducing the quality of
inferior to those provided for whites, 14thus
8
the education afforded black children.
"There just are not enough bodies and people" in the Civil Rights Division "to
enforce that kind of a decision," Mr. Leonard said at a news conference. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 30, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
141 Brief for Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law at 5.
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143
144
145
146

Id. at 7.
Brief for NEA at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 2.
"To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their

race generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 3, quoting from Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494

(1954).
147 "The United States Office of Education, in an official report based on a nationwide
survey, found that 'the achievement of minority group children increases' in proportion to the
level of 'the educational aspirations and backgrounds of fellow students .... '" Brief for
NEA at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
These findings are corroborated by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights, which concluded that "the effects of racial composition of schools are cumulative. The longer Negro students are in desegregated schools, the better is their academic achievement.... Conversely, there is a growing deficit for Negroes who remain
in racially isolated schools." Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
148

Id. at 2.
For example, the Commission on Civil Rights found that, in a sixteen-county
area of Alabama, white-attended school buildings and their contents were worth an
average of $981.00 per pupil. Those attended by blacks in the same area were worth
only $283.00 per pupil. Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
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The NBA lamented the failure of the judicial system to consider the "disastrous"
consequences of racial segregation:
[T]hese consequences are accruing daily and cannot be reversed. A year's
delay means that tens of thousands of black school children will endure
another important segment of their education in racial isolation; many of
these'children will complete their education during that period. It is time
that the question of delay be put in these human terms.149
V.

Assessments of the Decision

Reactions to Alexander ranged from exuberance to despair.5 0 Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, for example, saw the decision as timely and
vital:
This decision begins to respond to the public clamor for equal treatment and impartial justice for all Americans, by striking down the nebulous
phrase "all deliberate speed." Our Constitution does not give sanction to
delays in any judicial proceedings. There is no reason why "deliberate
speed" should have been allowed to hamDer this one.'51
Southern reaction wasnot so enthusiastic:
Most of the Southern reaction mingled anger and resignation. Observed
Paul Anthony, executive director of the Southern Regional Council: "A
lot of people started to believe that integration could and would be delayed, and now - wham!" Alabama's Attorney General MacDonald
Gallion called it the "Black Wednesday" decision. He feared, with only
some hyperbole, that in the South "the public school system will become a
colored school system." Some black educators in the South gloomily concurred. C. J. Duckworth, executive secretary of the predominantly Negro
Mississippi Teachers
Association, predicted: "Some districts will abolish
52
public schools."'
Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina attempted to nullify the "integration now" effect of the opinion by proposing an amendment"" to the Civil
Rights Act of 19641' that would make freedom of choice the law of the land,
notwithstanding the Supreme Courts caveat in Green that such plans may not
always meet the test of constitutionality. The amendment would add to the
Act a new title that, in Senator Ervin's words,
restores to local school boards their constitutional power to administer the
public schools committed to their charge, confers upon parents the right
149 Id. at 2-3.
150
In the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, whose attorneys had bitterly
disputed the Administration's delay of the Mississippi deadline, exuberance was
unrestrained. YES VIRGINIA, THERE IS A CONSTITUTION, read one of the
handlettered placards that sprouted on office doors and walls. Jokes about Chief
Justice Burger's split with the man who appointed him began to make Congressional
rounds. "Did you hear the news?" ran one. "It just came over the wires. Nixon's
withdrawn the nomination."
"Haynsworth?"
"No, Burger."
NEwswEmc, Nov. 10, 1969, at 35.
151 115 CONG. REc. S13481 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1969).
152 Tisa, Nov. 7, 1969, at 20.
153 S.3114, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
154 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28. 42 U.S.C.).
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to choose the public schools their children attend, secures to children the
right to attend the public schools chosen by their parents, and makes
effective the right of public school administrators and teachers to serve in
the schools in which they contract to serve.' 55
On the other hand, Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania proposed an amendment 56 that would add eight million dollars to the appropriations allotted by the
House for the funding of title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.15 7 That title
makes available federal financial assistance to school districts undergoing the
process of desegregation. Senator Scott noted that since the departments of
Justice and Health, Education and Welfare "have pledged their full cooperation" in carrying out Alexander's mandate "to terminate dual school systems
at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary schools,"' 58 there would
be an increased need for the additional amount.
At the present time, there are over 1,400 school districts in the 17
Southern and border States that do not have unitary school systems. In
the northern and western sections of the country, it is estimated that there
are approximately 350 school systems with one or more schools having more
than 50 percent minority student population. In light of the Supreme
Court's decision, it is not improbable to assume that all of these school
districts could request assistance from title IV during fiscal year 1970.15
The Ervin amendment died in the Senate Judiciary Committee; the Scott
amendment was passed by the Senate on November 5, 1969.'6
Several ironies surround Alexander and the situation that engendered it.
First and most important, perhaps, is the very real possibility that white "backlash" to the decision in the South will promote not new efforts toward integration,
but continued efforts toward even greater segregation, at least in those school
districts where black students are in the majority.
Both whites and Negroes ... in Holmes County,'where the suit leading
to the High Court order originated, agree that the ruling will lead to less,
not more, integration. They say it could even result in a completely
segregated school system.
This outlook reflects the fact that Holmes County is more than 70%o
black. The outnumbered whites have grudgingly gone along with integration until now, but with the Federal Government trying to effect widespread integration, the prospect of white children attending predominantly
black schools arise. And few.., doubt the outcome: The whites will withdraw into an already flourishing private school system, abandoning the
public schools to the blacks.' 6'
Second, the decision no doubt came as a surprise to the Nixon administration
and to the many southerners who "believed that Warren Burger's accession 6to2
Earl Warren's chair would somehow ease judicial pressure for integration."'
155

115 CONG. REc. S13764 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
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Id. at S13789.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c to 2000c-9 (1964).
115 CONG. REc. S13789 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1969).
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Id.
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Id. at S13792.
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
TME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 19.
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Indeed, the Court's order to "integrate now" made the new Chief Justice, in
Nixon's own words, an "extremist."
The decision for immediate school integration appeared to place all
eight Justices of the Supreme Court within President Nixon's definition
of an "extreme group."
At his last general news conference on Sept. 26 the President replied
to a question about delaying school segregation [sic] with this statement:
"It seems to me that there are two extreme groups. There are those
who want instant integration and those who want segregation forever.
I believe that we need to have a middle course between these two extremes.
That is the course on which we are embarked. I think it is correct."' ' 3
Third, through its obscure policy statement issued on July 3; 1969, concerning school desegregation," 4 through Secretary Finch's August 19, 1969,
letter asking for further delays, and through the Justice Department's active
endorsement of that request in seeking the Mississippi federal district court's
sanction for the delay, "the Nixon Administration brought [the Alexander]
ruling upon itself."'6 5 The July third statement emphasized federal enforcement of school desegregationi through litigation by the Justice Department
rather than through threat of a withdrawal of federal funds by HEW; 66
Secretary Finch's letter and the Justice Department's action both sought to
realize the administration's desegregation goals through the judicial, rather than
the administrative, machinery of government. Thus, "the Administration's emphasis on working through the courts - an approach tending to make integration slower and less painful for the South - produced a Supreme Court demand
07
for a faster pace."'
Finally, there was irony in' the Justice JDepartment'S uneasy alliance with
segregationist lawyers in pressing for the desegregation delay:
After arguing before the Supreme Court last week, Jerris Leonard refused to pose for photographers with a lawyer who had supported his plea.
163 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 34, col. 2.
164 Statement by Robert H. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare, and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General, July 3, 1969, in CIVIL RIGHTS COMm'rN
REPOrT, appendix C. While not purporting to change HEW's "guidelines" the general
uniform standards used by the department to implement title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964)-this statement nevertheless announced "new, coordinated procedures" for the federal effort to desegregate public school systems. The statement's ambiguous nature, which so upset some Civil Rights Division lawyers (see note 95
supra), was manifested in the acknowledgement that "[tlhis administration is unequivocally
committed to the goal of finally ending racial discrimination in schools, steadily and speedily,
in accordance with the law of the land;" 'while at the same time refusing to require the completion of desegregation in all districts by a "single arbitrary date" or by means of a "single,
arbitrary system." Similarly, the statement said that desegregation plans, to be acceptable,
"must ensure complete compliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Constitutional
mandate" but in the same breath allowed that in some districts "there may be sound reasons
for some limited delay," at least where there are "bonr fide educational and administrative
problems."
165 TIME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 20.
166 Under title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1964), a
federal agency extending financial aid under title IV of the Act has the power to cut off the
funds flowing to any recipient discriminating against an intended beneficiary of the federal
program on the basis of race, color, or national origin. This administrative control over the
purse strings has been one of the primary means used by HEW to ensure compliance with the
nondiscrimination requirements of title VI. See CIVIL RIOHTS COMM'N RxEPORT 5-6.
167 TiME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 20.
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"That is one honor I will decline," said Leonard, who is chief of the
Justice Department's Civil Rights Division. His reluctance was understandable. Leonard had just become the first Government lawyer ever to
ask the high court for a delay in school desegregation. His unaccustomed
ally was John C. Satterfield, of Mississippi, the most prominent segregationist lawyer in the country.18
VI. Conclusion
The phrase "all deliberate speed" was "never intended to be an invitation
to indefinite postponement."'6 9 The Supreme Court, by discarding that phrase
completely and by demanding immediate compliance with the law, has now
"brought an urgent new perspective to the complex and long-delayed process
of integration."' 70 Initially, it is true, Alexander may provoke "confusion, scattered violence and, temporarily at least, some damage to public education in
Indeed, it might have opened a veritable Pandora's box
parts of the South.''
of administrative and educational headaches for "black" and "white" schools
alike.'72 Still, the decision was timely and necessary. Such a holding was the only
effective way to put an end to the dilatory tactics used by unbending school
boards to prevent black children from enjoying their constitutional right to attend an integrated school. "If the Supreme Court has again trod heavily on
the domain of federal and local authorities, it is because these authorities have
evaded their responsibilities for too long."' 73
Patric J. Doherty
168 TIME, Oct. 31, 1969, at 77. See note 150 supra. An editorial in the New York Times
seized upon the unusual alliance between Leonard and Satterfield as the springboard for a
caustic attack on the Nixon administration's vacillating policy on school desegregation:
The shameful nature of the Government's case for delay was dramatized when
the chief of the Justice Department's civil rights division appeared in the Supreme
Court as the legal ally of those who pleaded the Southern cause. No comment on
the Federal role is necessary beyond the summary by Senator Strom Thurmond.
"The Nixon Administration stood with the South in this case," Senator
Thurmond said.
It will take a deliberate show of forthright leadership to make it clear that the
Justice Department as well as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare will
"now and hereafter," to borrow from the Court's words, stand with the law of the
land, not with political expediency. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1969, at 44, col. 1.
169 N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1969, at 44, col. 1.
170 TiME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 19.
171 Id. at 19-20.
172 In his concurring opinion in Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 38 U.S.L.W.
4219 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1970), Chief Justice Burger himself admitted that "the time has come to
clear up what seems to be a confusion, genuine or simulated, concerning this Coure's prior
mandates." Id. at 4220. He rebutted the suggestion that the Court had failed to define a
unitary school system by noting that "[i]n Alexander . . . we stated, albeit perhaps too cryptically, that a unitary system was one 'within which no person is to be effectively excluded from
any school because of race or color.'" Id. He then expressed his belief that the Court ought
soon "resolve some of the basic practical problems" that the Alexander mandate to "integrate
now" had precipitated:
[A]s soon as possible .. . we ought to resolve some of the basic practical problems
...
including whether, as a constitutional matter, any particular racial balance must
be achieved in the schools; to what extent school districts and zones may or must be
altered as a constitutional matter; to what extent transportation may or must be provided to achieve the ends sought by prior holdings of the Court. Id. See also U.S.
NE.ws & WORLD Rnp., Nov. 10, 1969, at 45 for a discussion of the difficulties involved in the
enforcement of the Alexander order.
173 TIME, Nov. 7, 1969, at 20.

